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Abstract
Stage plays, theories of theatre, narrative studies, and robotics research can serve to identify, explore, and interrogate theatrical
elements that support the effective performance of sociable humanoid robots. Theatre, including its parts of performance,
aesthetics, character, and genre, can also reveal features of human–robot interaction key to creating humanoid robots that are
likeable rather than uncanny. In particular, this can be achieved by relating Mori’s (1970/2012) concept of total appearance
to realism. Realism is broader and more subtle in its workings than is generally recognised in its operationalization in studies
that focus solely on appearance. For example, it is complicated by genre. A realistic character cast in a detective drama
will convey different qualities and expectations than the same character in a dystopian drama or romantic comedy. The
implications of realism and genre carry over into real life. As stage performances and robotics studies reveal, likeability
depends on creating aesthetically coherent representations of character, where all the parts coalesce to produce a socially
identifiable figure demonstrating predictable behaviour.
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1 The Likeability of the Bunraku Puppet
and the Importance of Its ‘total
appearance’
Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley, illustrated by his
graph [see Mori, 1970/2012], posits a scale of affinity. On the
y-axis, this scale of affinity posits not only positive results; it
also descends into the negative realm of the uncanny. The
x-axis represents a scale of degrees-of-realism of human
likeness. Mori’s graph, in short, indicates that the two are
causally related. The more realistically humanlike an arti-
ficial object appears, the more affinity it will engender in
human observers until the tipping point when responses
plunge into the uncanny valley before rising again to the fig-
ure of the healthy human, which attracts the highest degree
of affinity. Mori reflects upon reasons for the likability of
the bunraku puppet (Fig. 1) and, in the process, indicates
that realism may be a more subtle and broad category than is
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suggested by degrees-of-realism of appearance. Mori posi-
tions the bunraku puppet as inspiring more affinity on his
graph than any other inanimate object, second only to an ill
and a healthy person. His reflection reads as follows:
I don’t think that, on close inspection, a bunraku puppet
appears similar to a human being. Its realism in terms
of size, skin texture, and so on, does not even reach
that of a realistic prosthetic hand. But when we enjoy
a puppet show in the theater, we are seated at a certain
distance from the stage. The puppet’s absolute size is
ignored, and its total appearance, including hand and
eye movements, is close to that of a human being. So,
given our tendency as an audience to become absorbed
in this form of art, we might feel a high level of affinity
for the puppet. [14]
Mori observes that the degree of realism of the physi-
cal appearance of the bunraku puppet is not high but that,
in spite of this, we feel a high level of affinity for it. He
indicates that the puppet’s total appearance as a humanlike
object is important and incorporates a number of elements,
including physical appearance and size as well as hand and
eye movements. In Mori’s account, the realism of some of
these elements offsets or compensates for others that are
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Fig. 1 The character Osono, from the play Hade Sugata Onna Maig-
inu (艶容女舞衣), in a performance by the Tonda Puppet Troupe of
Nagahama, Shiga Prefecture
less-than-realistic. Mori also indicates that the puppet’s total
appearance is bound to its theatrical context in which an audi-
ence sits at some distance from the stage and has a ‘tendency
[…] to become absorbed in this form of art’ [14].
It may be that the bunraku puppet belongs more properly
on the first peak of Mori’s graph, rather than the second,
and that the first peak should be higher than the second.
However, as a theatre scholar interested in the design and
applications of sociable robots, Mori’s reflections about how
realism connects to total appearance, where total appearance
includes elements of physical appearance while extending
beyond it, are evocative. Indeed, it is worthwhile to exam-
ine more closely the relationship between realism not only
to the physical components of an object but also to ele-
ments bound up in its context, which frames and directs
the way an object is interpreted. In the case of the bun-
raku puppet, the context is the stage, where matters of
aesthetics—specifically, character and genre—are important.
However, stories and characters are fundamental to real life
contexts, too, so have relevance beyond the stage. Yuval
Noah Harari, in Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, tells
how the ‘imagined order’ [9] has worked through history to
establish communities—social, cultural, political, economic,
religious, and so on. Through myths, the imagined order—an
inter-subjective phenomenon—embeds itself materially and
shapes our desires.
This paper will examine theatrical parts, processes, and
performances with a view to identifying theatrical insights
with social implications. Its key questions are: What is indi-
cated by Mori’s reference to total appearance and how can
it be useful to robotics researchers? How does Mori’s notion
of ‘total appearance’ connect to realism in creating likeable
sociable robots? And what can enhanced knowledge and
understanding of theatre—including performance, aesthet-
ics, character, and genre—contribute to research that seeks
to create humanlike objects that are likeable as opposed to
uncanny?
Robotics, psychology, narrative studies, and theatre can
assist answering these questions, as can analysis of perform-
ing robots cast in stage plays in sociable roles. At times,
this paper’s analysis and corresponding arguments arise from
first-person responses to robots and performing robots. This
discussion may sometimes be unsubstantiated by empirical
evidence, in the form of, for example, survey results. Such
reflections are intended as propositions contributing to ongo-
ing discussions about how to create likeable sociable robots
rather than as hard and fast evidence.
2 Making a case for theatre in the work
of social robotics
Theatre can assist in understanding the causes of audience
responses to robots where these extend beyond biology and
evolutionary psychology. Robots were given form by a dra-
matic play called R.U.R.[4] about a century ago. There are no
essential species-specific qualities, processes, or biologically
evolved mechanisms that cause humans to like humanlike,
but not too humanlike, artificial objects because Homo sapi-
ens did not evolve in an environment populated by android
Homo sapiens. Androids evolved, initially, in the imagi-
nation, in stories. Studies of the uncanny valley sensibly
borrow from areas beyond robotics and animation to the-
orise that uncanny responses to artificial humanlike objects
are likely bound to fear of death, disease, threat, and the
unknown (including the supernatural). Such work is impor-
tant but theatre offers additional explanations to account for
audience responses, which are manipulated by stage rep-
resentations and actions designed to make spectators jump
in fright, experience eeriness, or develop strong affinity for
a character. Given that the very notion of robots derives
from the imagination and a stage play, it is worth consid-
ering the role that performance and narrative structures play
in our human–robot social engagements by reframing the
human–robot relation as a culturally informed one.
A number of scholars recognize the possibilities and bene-
fits of exploring robotics through theatre and performance, in
theory and in practice. Some have focused on ways in which
acting theories and approaches can support robotics program-
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ming (including Lu and Smart [14]; Breazeal [2]; Hoffman
[12, 13]; Knight [14]; and Knight and Gray [14]) while
others have explored how elements of performance—in-
cluding language, facial expressions, the body, posture, and
movement—can be employed expressively in the design and
programming of robots (Ishiguro [14]; Lin [14]; Lu and
Smart [14]; Breazeal [2]; Bretan et al. [3]; Knight [14];
Knight and Gray [14]; Knight and Simmons [14]; Jochum
and Murphey [14]; Popat [14]; LePage [14, 14]).
Lu and Smart offer a rationale for the relation between
robotics and theatre when they observe that ‘both theatre
and HRI aim to replicate some elements of humanity’ and
that ‘HRI and theatre are both inherently interactive’ [14].
Theatre, they suggest, may be used ‘both as the mode for
modeling interactions’—such as with the use of motion cap-
ture technology for modelling ways in which human beings
move— ‘and as the venue for testing the interactions’ [14].
In the first place, modelling the interactions of actors is
useful because actors are highly effective physical perform-
ers. Further, as Heather Knight observes, some performance
methodologies, such as those of physical theatre, have ‘a
long history of encoding and honing expression’ and, as
such, provide ‘pre-processed methodologies for interpreting
and communicating human non-verbal behaviors’ [14]. In
the second place, the performing arts provide roboticists, as
Tzung-De Lin observes, with access to the public. For roboti-
cists working on robots aimed to be used in everyday life,
particularly in social settings and interactions, the public, in
the form of audiences, ‘may be seen as an invaluable resource
to be mobilized […] to test people’s responses to robots’ [14]
with a view to making robots with which people will want to
interact.
Theatre also offers a complex multi-person/robot social
landscape in which to explore the role and design of robots.
Lin suggests that the robot lab is ‘an impoverished imita-
tion of the human “social” world’, that it ‘emphasizes cues,
such as gazes and gestures, and certain relationships, such
as a caregiver-infant relationship’ [14]. Lin prefers the stage
context, explaining that,
Theater, […] although still limited, provides a much
richer model of social interactions through its scenarios
and settings. In theatre, robot actors can be embed-
ded in many-to-many social relationships, which not
only move beyond the one-to-one relationship typical
of human–robot interaction but also are closer to the
interactions we experience in everyday life. [14]
This is an important point for those working towards the
design of humanoid robots intended for compelling social
interactions with people. In the real world, sociable partic-
ipants are required to fulfil more than one social role at a
time. Theatre, while continuing to offer a controlled context,
provides a site to test robot characters performing a variety
of social roles, e.g. a sister, a daughter, a carer, a friend, and
so on, in a variety of social settings.
Lin also argues that theatre can offer an effective medium
for fostering acceptance of robots as sociable characters.
Jochum, Vlachos, Christoffersen, Nielsen, Hameed, and Tan
[14] propose, more explicitly, ‘that the co-creation of the-
atre between dramatists and robot researchers can assist the
acceptance of social robots by addressing user concerns in
specific application scenarios’. Theatre offers lively ‘what
if?’ scenarios that allow robotics engineers and theatre-
makers, imaginatively, to identify and respond to potential
human–robot social situations and relationships, as well as
designs and implications for sociable characters and roles.
The sorts of speculative contexts for sociable robots that
have been effectively staged to date include a care scenario
between a human and a socially assistive robot (Jochum et al.
[14]); worker robots in the home that reject their program-
ming and refuse to work (Hirata and Ishiguro, I, Worker [11]);
a bank-worker robot that, one day, decides it would be nice to
buy pizza for everyone (Mick Livermore [14]); a robot com-
panion for a dying woman that recites poetry (Hirata and
Ishiguro, Sayonara [14]); a robot stand-in for a depressed
recluse that fulfils a variety of social roles, including sister,
servant, and friend (Hirata and Ishiguro [42]); a performer
stand-in for a writer who dislikes the task of delivering public
lectures (Rimini Protokoll and Thomas Melle, Uncanny Val-
ley [38]); domestic-worker robots and a romantic-companion
robot for a single, lonely man (Denisart [6]); a robot avatar
stand-in for a man who wants to live his life more perfectly
than he, himself, is capable (Talenti [14]); and a robot com-
panion for a woman with Alzheimers that also performs as
the woman’s (dead) husband (Pipeline Theatre Company,
Spillikin: A Love Story) [34].
Theatre obviously does not enjoy the cultural reach of
films or the novel. However, theatre’s liveness—its temporal
and physical proximity to audiences—gives it the capacity.
Theatrical structures and processes can assist in the cre-
ation and direction of believable, humanlike robots, which,
lacking high-level intelligence and personality or character
themselves, can nonetheless be made to appear as if they
possess such qualities. Indeed, some theatre-makers have
produced startling results by drawing artfully upon theatrical
methods to create character. The performance of Geminoid F
as android Ikumi in Three Sisters: Android Version is a case
in point [14]. (This performance will be analysed in some
depth in the next section.)
Before closing this section, a few words of caution about
employing theatre in robotics research. Stage characters are
coherent and meaningful in a way that people in real life
rarely are. In Western drama, a character generally acts
according to coherent objectives, which are meaningful in the
broader terms of the narrative and its themes. In contrast, as
Lin observes, ‘(a)ctual social situations are much noisier’ and
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‘the information communicated by actions is less clear’ [14].
Theatre, then, offers a relatively complex laboratory context,
which encourages emotional and critical engagement with
stage actor-characters, but it remains a laboratory that sim-
plifies much messier real-world contexts. In certain respects,
of course, this may be an advantage for robotics researchers
seeking to explore specific elements in a controlled setting.
Also, stage robots, unlike autonomous social robots
designed for real-world scenarios, are not sociable characters
or participants; they are aesthetic objects representing socia-
ble characters or participants. This is important because
audiences read aesthetic objects differently to objects they
encounter in real life. On stage, nothing is really happening;
the dramatic stakes for characters are not real. There is no tan-
gible, impending risk to characters or audience members, and
audiences are perfectly aware of this. Given this, and given
the semantic connection of fear with uncanny responses, it
may be that robots cast in stage scenarios reduce the potential
for uncanny audience reactions.
A connected point of caution is that aesthetic objects and
their actions are always overdetermined. They are loaded
with meaning in a way that ordinary objects in everyday
life are not. If a cup is dropped in your kitchen, you will
probably think nothing of it other than that the person who
dropped it was momentarily clumsy or careless. On stage,
however, unless you are led to believe otherwise, you read
the dropping of the cup as an intentional and meaningful
action. A character who drops a cup may be interpreted as
being nervous or inherently clumsy or showing signs of an
onset of an illness.
It might be argued, of course, that robots are themselves
overdetermined entities, even in real life, and that they will
remain so until they have become sufficiently ubiquitous
that they become mundane. Robots are always ‘meaning-
ful’ [14]. We see this if we consider the ‘resting’ robot. Lu
and Smart observe that a robot is ‘often programmed to have
“idle animations” which serve no explicit purpose, other than
to communicate to others that it is active and ready, not dead’
[14]. Robots, unlike humans or animals, are always signify-
ing, even when they are doing nothing. They are not alive and
have yet to become ordinary so while this is the case, theatre
remains a compelling ‘what if?’ setting for the exploration
of their design, character, and setting.
3 The Status of Mind
Robots are inherently performative; their identities derive
entirely from their performances. They have no essential
self to express. Lu and Smart are correct when they observe
that, ‘(u)ltimately, all social interactions can be viewed as
acting roles which the robot must perform’, indicating that
both actors and robots have ‘to get as close as possible to
the unobtainable ideal (normal social player/actual charac-
ter) by giving the correct outputs’ [14]. However, for the
robot, unlike for humans, the ‘correct outputs’ of character
are entirely artful and performative, rather than expressive.
Given this, the performative design, programming, and con-
textualisation of sociable robots are crucial to their effective
reception.
The robot, akin to the Chinese room in Searle’s thought
experiment, does not have a mind that understands, nor does it
need one, in order to be perceived as an apparently intelligent
and self-determining agent. However, if the sociable robot is
to be likeable, it needs more than to perform correct outputs;
it needs to appear to be a sociable character, and this means
seeming to have a mind.
The status of mind is important. Though K. Gray and D.
M. Wegner’s conclusion may be correct—that the appearance
of an experiencing mind in machines is tied to uncanniness
[8]—mind per se seems unlikely to be the problem. Indeed,
the appearance of mind seems likely to be key in creating
sociable robots. What matters is the type of character and
mind indicated: just as strong affinity is bound to a meet-
ing of like minds, uncanniness is bound to unpredictable or
malevolent characters and minds, rather than mind per se.
4 Science Fiction and the Imagination: How
We Perceive Robots
Human beings are adept at investing objects with personality.
We have all seen children play with inanimate toys, bring-
ing them, imaginatively, to life. Birnbaum et al. [1] (citing
Friedman, Kahn, & Hagman [2003] and Lee, Peng, Jin, &
Yan [2006]) refer to how ‘(p)eople tend to perceive robots as
social actors and attribute to them humanlike traits, including
mental states and personality’. My own playful explorations
with a Nao robot interacting with groups of people [14] sup-
ports as much.
Before it says or does anything, audiences invest the
humanoid robot with the promise, if not the fact, of intel-
ligent autonomy, character, and life. The robot derives this
promise in several ways. Firstly, the robot is an inherently
science-fictional entity. The very word, ‘robot’, was coined
by Karel Čapek’s science-fiction play, R.U.R. (1920/21) [4] to
describe humanlike artificial entities, produced in factories,
serving humankind as slaves. In the play, these mechanical
slaves turn, en masse, against their human oppressors, exter-
minating them. A couple of the robots, however, take on roles
at the end of the play that are akin to those of Adam and Eve
in the Garden of Eden, offering the promise of new life in
paradise founded on innocence, love, and selflessness. This
kind of narrative and set of character roles for robots have
repeated themselves in our science fiction stories ever since,
in the West if not the East.
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Many real-life robots significantly draw their potential
identity from common cultural science-fictional depictions.
Kriz, Ferro, Damera, and Porter III [14] provide evidence
that cultural attitudes to robots are bound to science-fictional
representations. Exploring ‘the relationship between capabil-
ities of robots portrayed in popular science fiction films and
students’ expectations about a real robot’, the authors find
that, with a few notable exceptions, expectations map fairly
accurately onto their content analysis of science fiction films
featuring robots.
Secondly, the humanoid robot is invested in the promise
of autonomy, character, and life by virtue of its relation to the
puppet. However, whereas the puppet has strings that com-
pose a fundamental element of the puppet’s lively appearance
and form, the robot’s ‘strings’ are hidden and we are invited
to read the object as autonomous and, in its way, alive and
self-determining, even when it is not.
All this has the effect of positioning spectators in cog-
nitive readiness to identify humanoid robots as capable of
intentional self-determination and as certain kinds of char-
acters fulfilling certain kinds of roles, including roles that are
threatening. From such a starting point, theatrical parts and
processes serve to support the imaginative steps of specta-
tors ‘believing’ a humanoid robot is a character, has a mind,1
and perceives them back in friendly or unfriendly terms. The
humanoid robot need only perform its part well enough for
the observer to infer mental states where none exist.
5 An Account of How Audience Reception
Theory Explains the Perception
of a Robot’s ‘total appearance’
Understanding how an audience gains an impression of a
stage actor’s total appearance, be this actor human, puppet,
or robot, can assist the creation of a robot’s total appearance.
Elizabeth Ann Jochum and Todd Murphey, writing about
uncanny responses to humanlike movement in robots [14],
draw upon theatre scholar Bert O. States’ influential theory
of binocular vision [14]. They explain how, in the minds
of the audience, the material reality of the stage is brought
together with the imaginative realm, comprising mental con-
cepts, which meaningfully identify the physical objects. So,
for example, actor is brought together with character, and the
real world of the theatre with the fictional world of the play.
1 Chemers identifies the Eliza effect as being important to game design-
ers. It is also important to humanoid robot designers. Chemers observes
how ‘humans are quite prone to perceive computer intelligences as pos-
sessing far greater depth, complexity, and emotional content than they
possibly could’ [5]. He also observes that the kind of cognitive disso-
nance bound to the Eliza effect is the sort ‘that theatre artists from all
ages have sought to foster; it, or something like it, is what Coleridge
called “suspension of disbelief.”’.
Theatre exploits this process for dramatic effect. When
audiences watch realistic drama, they watch performances
that directors and actors work meticulously to invest with
clues, juxtapositions, and gaps, which encourage audiences
to perceive particular kinds of characters who have the poten-
tial for particular kinds of behaviours. Audiences join the dots
of any given performance to construct a picture of a character.
They bring their subjective perspectives and their culturally
and socially shared knowledge to bear upon their perception
of the character, and they assess its potential for action. Is
it friend or is it foe? Should we like it or should we fear it?
What will it do?
Roboticists know that ‘the mechanisms underlying per-
ception of individuals in our environment are predictive in
nature (Urgen et al. [14]). They know that appearance is
bound up with expectations about a given humanlike object
and that if one’s predictions about that object are violated,
there is the potential for the uncanny to arise. Writing about
the relation between appearance and movement, Urgen et al.
explain:
(T)he form (appearance) of the visually presented agent
provide(s) a context from which the subject infer(s)
how the agent would move over time (e.g. a mechan-
ical/robotic appearance would activate the semantic
network that includes motion information associated
with robotic appearances), the same way a preceding
word group provides a context for the upcoming word
in a sentence (e.g. I take coffee with cream and ___
(“sugar” instead of “dog”)), and activates the relevant
semantic network associated with the word group.
However, what roboticists sometimes miss is the signifi-
cance of the humanlike object’s identity and corresponding
character, which are implied by all the details of its appear-
ance.
6 How Affinity, Likeability, and Familiarity
Are All Important for the Production
of Shinwakan
The character implied by the physical appearance and per-
formance of a humanlike artificial object is fundamentally
important if it is to inspire shinwakan, a neologism of
Mori’s creation that has come, most often, to be translated
into the English word, ‘affinity’, although ‘familiarity’ and
‘likeability’ are also used. In fact, each of these English
terms—affinity, likeability, and familiarity—has a role in
producing shinwakan. We need to be familiar with the char-
acter type that composes and frames our perception of an
artificial humanlike object in order to like or feel affinity
with it. When Mori identifies the bunraku puppet as a partic-
ularly likeable artificial object, he assumes familiarity with
123
International Journal of Social Robotics
it, some knowledge or experience of it. If we have never
before encountered bunraku puppetry, we are unlikely to
rate the puppet particularly highly on Mori’s axis of affin-
ity. We do not need to have seen a particular object before
in order to like it—it can be a stranger to us (here I contra-
dict the argument of Yamada, Kawabe and Ihaya [14]; and
Kawabe, Sasaki, Ihaya, and Yamada [14])—but we do need
to be able to categorise it, to identify it as a character type
drawn from our stock of socially and culturally shared stories,
be these historical, supernatural, political, expressionistic,
comic, melodramatic, romantic, mythic, fairytale, horror,
religious, surreal, socially realistic, or whatever. These sto-
ries are not merely the stories we read in books or see in
films or on the stage, they are the stories that build our con-
ception of the world (to refer back to Harari’s Sapiens). To be
strongly likeable, the character of the artificial object needs to
appear to be familiar, like us, our potential kin or ‘soul mate’
(MacDorman qtd. in Wang et al. [14]). Something about it
needs to cause us to feel we are ‘in synchrony’ with it, that we
are experiencing a ‘meeting of minds’. In short, if we are to
experience strongly positive responses to an object, irrespec-
tive of its species form, we need to be able to identify it as a
friend, not a foe, and predict its corresponding behaviours.
7 Three Sisters: Android Version: An Example
of a Very Likeable Stage Robot Character
Character is a powerful element, exploited by theatre-makers
casting robot performers in plays. The performances of
robots cast as humanlike characters in plays can compen-
sate for flaws in the physical performance of human likeness.
Indeed, the form of a humanlike artificial object’s character
can operate so powerfully that it overrides the empirical fea-
tures of its appearance and causes it to become extremely
likeable.
The playwright and director, Oriza Hirata, creates
‘android theatre’ with Japan’s Seinendan Theater Com-
pany, in collaboration with Osaka University Robot Theater
Project, led by Hiroshi Ishiguro. Hirata has notoriously
expounded opinions directly relevant to this paper, including:
‘Actors do not need to have minds’ and ‘Actors need only act
like robots’ (Sasaki qtd. in Lin [14]). Hirata positions android
performers alongside human ones in naturalistic stage plays
with the intention of investing his robot performers with the
illusion of mind and character. Avoiding the traditional meth-
ods of the naturalistic actor—character work operating at
the level of psychology where the actor develops his char-
acter’s backstory, relationships, and objectives, with a view
to transforming himself into his character—Hirata attends,
instead, to the physical details of both his android and human
actors’ performances, to make them as close to life as pos-
sible. This approach is based on Hirata’s view that ‘(m)ost
human communication is not empathic but rather based on
learned patterns of response to stimuli’ (qtd. in Poulton [14]).
While this may well be true, it is not sufficient as an
account of how audiences respond to robot performers.
Hirata’s employment of hyper-realistic theatrical form works
to direct audience attention and expectations in conventional
ways, just as bunraku puppetry works conventionally in
Mori’s example. In theatrical realism and naturalism, the
audience, the audience expects to engage with the details of
surface performance in order to infer, and focus on, character
psychology and, more particularly, the subtext underpinning
the staged social interactions, irrespective of the form of
the performer. Meticulously choreographing and modulat-
ing the physical performances of his human and android
actors by attending to volume of speech, length of pauses,
vocal intonation, speed of vocal delivery, quality and type of
movement, details of facial expressions, and so on, Hirata
exploits the audience’s tendency to conflate real and imag-
ined elements in their perception of a stage object’s total
appearance. He also exploits the structures of realist and
naturalist drama, which operate from the assumption that
underneath the surface appearances of human interactions
lie psychological character truths. He co-opts these struc-
tures to fabricate the sensation of character, consciousness,
and agency in his automata without these elements being
evident in the robot performers themselves.
Geminoid F (the figure on the left in Fig. 2) is a tele-
operated mechanical puppet that masquerades as humanlike
autonomous android characters in Hirata’s plays. How effec-
tive are Geminoid F’s performances and what are the parts
that make them effective? Ishiguro, Geminoid F’s engineer,
holds the view that facial expressions are key to Geminoid
F’s successful performance of its sophisticated android char-
acter, where success is judged by the robot’s capacity to make
audiences believe in, and weep for, it. Ishiguro argues that
while humanlike appearance is important, it is so only inso-
far as it facilitates the expression of humanlike emotion: ‘(o)f
course the robot needs to have a kind of a minimal (human-
like) appearance’; it would be no good for a robot to be, for
example, ‘… just a cup or a kettle’ because this would make
it ‘difficult to read the human-like emotions’ [14].
This seems somewhat disingenuous given the exactitude
of human likeness that Ishiguro has evidently aimed for
in Geminoid F’s look. It is true that the robot’s highly
humanlike face enables audiences to mistake its signs of emo-
tions—its smiles and frowns—as the emotions themselves.
Such emotional potential is important for its indication of
an individual consciousness, which, in turn, is almost cer-
tainly required if empathetic responses are to be prompted
in audiences. (We appear to have a tendency to feel for crea-
tures, which themselves appear to feel.) However, Ishiguro
has designed Geminoid F with a particular look, indicative
of a socially significant identity, which signals far more than
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Fig. 2 Geminoid F (left) and Bryerly Long in Oriza Hirata’s Sayonara.
Photo ©Tatsuo Nambu/Aichi Triennale 2010
mere consciousness. This identity operates to direct audience
responses to the robot as a certain kind of character.
The costly avatar-type android character is performed by
the robot performer, Geminoid F: a mechanical puppet. Its
dialogue is pre-recorded and its movements are those of an
actor backstage who operates the robot using a motion track-
ing system. To what degree is such a mechanical puppet
successful at performing its sociable robot-avatar part? On
the one hand, it is not successful in that, unlike a human actor,
Geminoid F cannot transform itself physically, mentally, or
emotionally into its character. Furthermore, its performance
of a conscious and self-determining android character is
flawed, with delays in verbal and gestural cues and, over-
all, there is a woodenness to the robot’s performance. It is
insufficiently quick and fluid at responding to the actions of
those around it. However, in spite of such flaws, from the per-
spective of the audience and at the level of its imagination,
Geminoid F transforms into android Ikumi. In a review of
earlier work by Seinendan Theater Company, also featuring
Geminoid F alongside other robot performers (Robovie R3s),
Alexis Soloski remarks: ‘these automata excite […] sympa-
thy to an equivalent, or perhaps even greater, degree than
their human counterparts’ [14], such that we are prompted to
misperceive kinship and feel empathy for them.2 Meanwhile,
having appeared in a film version of Sayonara (directed by
Koji Fukada), Geminoid F was nominated for the best actress
2 Additional evidence of audience empathy for Hirata’s stage robots is
provided in the form of survey results responding to another of Hirata’s
android performances, I, Worker, which features Mitsubishi’s Waka-
maru robot. The two Wakamaru robots in this play are not as humanlike
as the Geminoid F in Three Sisters, nor are their characters conceived
as being as sociable or sophisticated as the character performed by
the Geminoid F. However, Lin reports that their treatment by Hirata
as sociable worker robots elicited empathetic responses from audience
members. Quoting Kuroki (2010), Lin writes that a survey responding
to a performance of I, Worker on 25 November 2008 revealed that ‘70
percent of the audience reported either feeling or moderately feeling
empathy for the robots’ [14].
award at the Tokyo International Film Festival in 2015. Even
if the android did not ultimately win, the nomination indi-
cates an effective performance of its character. Birnbaum
et al. observe that people are generally willing to play along
with the illusion that the robot ‘is a sentient creature appro-
priate for relational interactions’ [1]. Citing Sherry Turkle
(2007), they report that people ‘are often willing to ignore
the mechanical aspects of the robot and to treat it in a manner
similar to how they would respond to a fellow human being’
[1].
In Hirata’s Three Sisters, the characters of android and
human Ikumi are foregrounded in their juxtaposition. Cast in
comparative terms—indeed, on one occasion, the two figures
are literally positioned side by side on stage—the collocation
of android and human both exposes and disguises the distinc-
tiveness of their species forms. In the process, audiences are
invited to examine and compare the forms of the human and
android figures in light of their responses to these forms.
In the process, Hirata’s stage play interrogates the role that
species form plays in positioning audience responses in terms
of positive or negative shinwakan.
In the first place, Hirata’s presentation of human and
android Ikumi side by side is notable for indicating that
uncanniness may not necessarily connect exclusively or,
even, primarily to artificial humanlike entities. Lin observes
that,
When Ikumi first appears suddenly with an expression-
less face onstage, a feeling of uncanniness—toward the
human Ikumi, not the geminoid IKUMI—arises. The
similarity of movements and sound of the two turns the
idea of the uncanny valley upside down. [14]
The uncanniness arises from the abruptness and
strangeness of human Ikumi’s appearance alongside her
android doppelgänger. The story has taught us, up to this
point, that human Ikumi is dead so when she appears, we
don’t know how to place her and we don’t know how to
place her. The two Ikumis are almost indistinguishable in
appearance terms. As Lin observes, their faces are similarly
expressionless but, more than this, they are of a similar phys-
ical size, they wear their hair the same way, are dressed the
same, and are likewise more or less motionless on stage
(although human Ikumi walks whereas the android char-
acter drives herself in her wheelchair). Lin reports that,
‘(a)ccording to an anthropologist who attended as a member
of the audience [of Three Sisters]’, the feeling of eeriness
arises in response to the puzzle: ‘who is the real daughter’?
(Lin quoting Feng [14]). When human Ikumi first appears
and the two figures appear onstage together, looking so sim-
ilar, we are, for a moment, doubtful about how to categorise
them and during that moment, human Ikumi paradoxically
appears to be one thing and another: familiar and abruptly
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foreign. Is human Ikumi real or is she another android or
something else?
Another important feature of the performances of android
and human Ikumi are the ways in which their species forms
and roles are foregrounded in the performance, and the impli-
cations of these for their likeability. They are both quiet and
thoughtful, with a tendency to be abrupt, which sometimes
topples over into rudeness. However, android Ikumi repeat-
edly reminds us that, unlike her human original, she has no
knowledge of death; she can smell but she cannot eat; she
cannot lie; and she cannot forget. This may be significant
in terms of her likeability, given Schwind et al.’s findings
that ‘the positive impression of a realistic animal is lost if it
represents something other than itself’ [14]. Geminoid F’s
performance also marks out her species differences by virtue
of her mechanical acting, which, compared to her human
counterpart’s performance, lacks fluency and spontaneity.
Also, seen up close, one can detect the vacancy behind the
robot’s eyes. Despite an apparent expression of emotion in
the form of a gentle smile, there is no spark of life or mind
behind the smile to lend it urgency or purpose. The smile is no
more than a signifier. One would expect such species differ-
ences—some of which reveal themselves, in terms of acting,
as flaws—to manifest negative audience responses towards
the android. However, the opposite is true: faced with the
android-human juxtaposition, it is android Ikumi who mate-
rializes as the more likeable character. According to Mori’s
theory, this should not be possible: one should not be able to
feel greater empathy for an android than a human, particularly
one whose performance of human likeness is flawed, occa-
sionally jarringly so. So how does Hirata manage to direct
an audience to such a positive, even empathetic, response for
an android?
The answer lies with quality of character and the gemi-
noid’s performance of a sociable role. She appears sociable,
warm, and responsive: she sits with her family and guests
and partakes in conversations with them, seeming to demon-
strate a high level of understanding of human needs and
feelings; her voice is soft in tone and predictable in its mod-
ulations; and her turns of the head and range of expressions,
including smiles, are sensitively choreographed by Hirata to
indicate the android’s conscious and thoughtful attention to
the human characters in the scene. Such performative ele-
ments, combined with details of her appearance, mean that
this physically attractive, woman-like, twenty-something
android, demonstrating a sophisticated AI, conjures a quality
of character that is intelligent, attractive, gentle, direct, calm,
honest, compassionate, and, crucially, sociable. Indeed, of
the two, it is human, not android Ikumi, who demonstrates
qualities that might be deemed machine-like: human Ikumi
seems comparatively cold, is frequently dissatisfied, less
eager to please, and her voice has a harder, flatter quality
to it. Human Ikumi’s uncanniness may also connect to these
qualities. Gray and Wegner observe that humans ‘incapable
of fear or love’ are unnerving and that ‘the uncanny valley
may apply to… robotic humans’ as well as humanlike robots
[8].
Human Ikumi is the biological sister in the Fukazawa fam-
ily but she does not perform the role in the sorts of ways
we expect of, or culturally value in, a sibling. It is android
Ikumi whose performance of a sister finds a more imagina-
tively and emotionally compelling form: she takes an interest
in her elder sisters and brother and participates in the activi-
ties and concerns of the household with apparent selflessness
and compassion. Android Ikumi is positioned in performative
terms as kin to the Fukazawa siblings and in the process, she
prompts the sisters (and her audiences) to experience positive
shinwakan for her, a sense of synchronicity, a sense that she,
despite her form as android, is friendly towards them, that
she understands and likes them in a way that the real Ikumi
appears not to. The fact that android Ikumi is not really Ikumi
appears to matter less to these sisters (and, by implication, the
audience) than her performance of the role of sister, which
materialises in an idealized and friendly form.
In this example, we see a demonstration of the signifi-
cance of dramatic character. The imaginary (character) and
the real (performer) are fused into a singly perceived, dialec-
tical phenomenon.
Some interesting questions arise from the representation
of android Ikumi in Hirata’s Three Sisters that engage with
questions about the design and programming of sociable
robots. How far might sociability be important to produc-
ing positive, as opposed to negative, shinwakan? (Negative
shinwakan, here, does not necessarily refer to uncanniness
but more generally to a lack of synchrony or kinship.) How far
might predictability be important in positioning a performer
as kin and eliciting positive shinwakan, or its converse,
bukimi, i.e. eeriness (in the event that predictability corre-
sponds with perceived threat)? Can an unsociable character,
human or android, inspire positive feelings of kinship in audi-
ences? Might my own cool feelings towards human Ikumi
derive from her machinelike character qualities? Or might
my response derive from the perceived contradictions in her
form and performance and in her character role and character
actions?
This section has identified performative elements that
work to position Geminoid F, cast in her role as android
Ikumi, as a likeable figure. The importance of coherence of
character, understood in aesthetic terms, will be picked up
and explored in the next section.
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8 Aesthetics, Genre, and Character
Coherence
8.1 Aesthetics: A Better TermThan Attractiveness
A study by Schwind, Leicht, Jäger, Wolf, and Henze asks
the question: ‘Is there an uncanny valley of virtual animals?’
[14] Focusing on animated representations of cats in a variety
of computer games, the study does something important: it
substitutes attractiveness for aesthetics, explaining the sub-
stitution by way of its focus on animal-like objects rather
than human-like ones.
Aesthetics is much richer terrain than attractiveness,
which is subsumed by the broader category of the former.
Aesthetics is the study of subjective and sensori-emotional
values relating to art and beauty. As a branch of philoso-
phy, it asks questions about the judgement of sentiment and
taste and investigates how and why we find some things
beautiful and not others. Aesthetics engages with ways in
which artists imagine, create, and perform works of art as
well as indicating styles and principles for a given genre of
art (for example, distinguishing between the Impressionist
versus Cubist aesthetic). In their study, Schwind et al. are
interested in subjective and sensori-emotional values attach-
ing to the representations of the cats as well as the coherency
of the cats’ representational categories, styles, and principles
as they find form in their various animations.
8.2 How the Significance of Realism Expands
Beyond Degrees-Of-Realism
In a point that engages with aesthetics, Schwind et al. identify
problems with ‘(t)he manipulation of realism’ in uncanny
valley studies. The concept of realism, Schwind et al. note,
can be compromised because it is ‘partially biased by other
associations’ [14]. This is an important observation because
it starts to recognise the nuanced implications of realism,
which extend beyond degrees-of-realism.
Realism indicates a representational form in artistic fields,
including theatre, that connects to a distinct set of logics and
styles. For example, realism offers a positivist representation
of the world that follows the laws of cause and effect. You
don’t get demons, ghosts, monsters, or talking scarecrows in
realistic theatre. (Such entities belong in, for example, surre-
alism, which operates at the level of the dream and, as such,
refuses the logic of everyday life, adopting a more abstract
and poetic style of representation.) Realism is distinctive
from other forms—such as expressionism or surrealism—by
virtue of its objectivity, its focus on appearance (on what
is said, how things look and sound, how people relate to
each other), as well as its implicit assumptions about peo-
ple. In realism, people are understood to be fundamentally
psychological individuals who are intelligent and capable of
reasoned behaviours as they set about pursuing their goals
by applying a variety of tactics and actions within recognis-
able social contexts.3 This conception of realism is, broadly,
analogous with its meaning in uncanny valley studies, which,
focusing on human likeness, targets appearance, and assumes
a way of human being that is social, intelligent, and self-
determining.
However, realism is complicated by the fact that it is cate-
gorised and structured by genre. Examples of genres include
social realism, Epic Theatre, kitchen-sink drama, comedies
(farce, satire, parody), tragedy, tragi-comedies, science fic-
tion, dystopian dramas, detective dramas, romantic dramas,
melodrama, verbatim drama, and so on. This is significant
because the specific forms of stories in which realistic char-
acters are cast function to clarify their roles, i.e. what those
characters do and how they relate to society, at the same time
as they influence audience expectations about those charac-
ters.
Consider the character of a male police officer. This char-
acter may be performed realistically by a single actor in a
number of different dramatic genres and each time, the audi-
ence will engage with him differently, sometimes liking him,
sometimes fearing him, sometimes rooting for him, and so on.
In a comedy, the police officer figure is commonly depicted as
a figure of fun or ridicule whereas, cast in a detective drama,
he may feature as the hero of the drama, acting to protect
the innocent. In a dystopian drama, the police officer may be
one of the villains whereas in a television soap, he may be
the object of our curiosity and sympathy as we watch him
struggle to juggle work and home demands.
If a director were casting a single actor for the figure of
a police officer in a farce, she may require him to grow a
moustache, appear bald, use make-up to redden his nose, and
ask him to smile inappropriately at everything—anything to
contribute to the sense that this figure is to be ridiculed. If this
same actor were to be cast as a police officer in a dystopian
drama, he may be given slicked back hair, eyebrows that rise
at the edges, and be required to wear a serious and sombre
demeanour, facially and physically, at all times.
The key point, here, is that when we engage with a real-
istic figure, we look for clues to know how to interpret and
categorise that figure according to genre. If we see a face
sporting a serious expression, with eyebrows that are raised
at the outer edges, we are likely to draw upon common cul-
tural narratives categorising that character as, say, a villain.
3 Surrealism, by contrast, might foreground the body and poetic images
and allow for a logic of actions that is irrational and, possibly, super-
natural.
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8.3 How Character Impacts Upon Studies
Investigating Degrees-Of-Realism in Relation
to the Likeability of Artificial Humanlike Objects
This notion of aesthetic character coherence is revealing
when held up against studies presenting a face on a contin-
uum of realism to test how people respond to human versus
animated or cartoon abstractions. A number of such studies
have produced results that contradict Mori’s, or refined ver-
sions of Mori’s theory. Some of these contradictions arise
not because the theories are wrong but because insufficient
attention has been paid to the characteristics of the figures
represented or to their forms of representation, where such
information indicates particular character types and sets up
corresponding audience expectations, which connect to like-
ability and uncanniness.
Yamada et al.’s study [14] seeks to demonstrate the valid-
ity of their hypothesis that ‘the uncanny valley phenomenon
is determined not by the visual similarity to a real human,
but the categorization difficulty for an object’. Their results
are ambiguous with participant responses showing that ‘the
images that were difficult to categorize were not always neg-
atively evaluated’. For example, the highest likeability score
for Experiment 3 went to the most ambiguous facial cate-
gorisation (see the middle face of the bottom line of faces in
Fig. 3). Meanwhile, results attaching to Experiments 1 and
2 show that the highest likeability scores were attributed to
the stuffed human (see the figure on the far right of the top
line of faces in Fig. 3) and the cartoon dog (see the figure on
the far left of the second line of faces in Fig. 3). The authors
propose that attractiveness may be a factor in these results.
This is possible. However, other reasons for these likeability
scores are character type and character coherence.
The real human male face in Experiment 1 (see the top
line of images in Fig. 3) is placed at one end of a scale of
human likeness and a ‘stuffed human’ appears at the other
end. What is key, here, is that the stuffed human is not a
generic figure (even assuming such a figure is feasible); it
is Charlie Brown. Charlie Brown is a well-known and well-
loved cartoon character in the comic strip, Peanuts. Assuming
the study participants are familiar with this comic strip, it
is unsurprising that the character of Charlie Brown is more
likeable than the real human who looks very nice but whose
character is not so immediately identifiable.
In Experiment 2, the likeability of the cartoon dog was
found to be higher than both the stuffed dog (see Fig. 3,
second line of images from the top; the cartoon dog appears
far left and the stuffed dog appears far right) and the real
dog (see the bottom row of images of dogs in Fig. 3; the real
dog is at the far left). The cartoon dog is, of course, Snoopy,
another well-known and well-loved character from Peanuts.
Again, given its character form, this figure’s likeability is
predictable. Finally, the remarkable results of Experiment 3
Fig. 3 The visual stimuli for Experiments 1, 2, and 3 for Yamada et al.
[14]. © 2012 John Wiley and Sons. Reprinted, with permission, from
Japanese Psychological Research
(see the bottom row of images of dogs in Fig. 3; the real dog is
at the far left) are that the lowest likeability score corresponds
with the real male face, which is at the far left of the series of
morphed images, and the greatest likeability is scored by the
face with the greatest category ambiguity (the middle face
on the bottom row of images). This becomes less puzzling if
you consider that the least likeable male figure on the bottom
row (far left) is wearing a very serious expression and has
slightly pointed eyebrows, a feature that casting directors
would exploit; as already indicated, in a film, this figure might
be cast as a villain.
Hanson et al.’s survey, meanwhile, ‘show[s] a continuum
of humanoid depictions, shifting from cartoonish to realistic
over six frames’ [7] (Fig. 4). The authors use the results of
their survey to argue against the hypothesis that robots should
not look or act in strongly humanlike ways. The problem with
their study is that the humanlike model they use to disprove
Mori’s hypothesis is Princess Jasmine from Disney’s Aladdin
(1992).
The authors state that the results of their study ‘clearly
showed that viewers found the whole continuum positively
acceptable’. They continue: ‘The reaction never dipped into
the negative region, (and) thus showed no sign of the repul-
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sion that defined the “valley” of Mori’s uncanny valley’.
Though Hanson et al.’s discussions are persuasive elsewhere
in their paper, their claims that participant responses to the
images of Princess Jasmine disprove the veracity of Mori’s
hypothesis are less so. Princess Jasmine is another well-
known fictional character in the West, in this case, a heroine
whose characteristics of beauty, high spirits, and a desire to
marry for love make her likeable, whatever form she takes,
be this animated or real. In fact, Princess Jasmine is at her
most likeable, according to the study results, in the first two
images where she is depicted as an animation. Despite the
fact this contradicts Mori’s hypothesis, this should be no sur-
prise, given that this is Princess Jasmine’s authentic form.
The human version of her (see the far right of Fig. 4) is an
‘artificial’ representation, just as Snoopy’s manifestation in
Yamada et al.’s study as a stuffed animal is merely a version
of his more likeable original cartoon form.
Having considered ways in which highly characterful
figures influence studies testing for likeability, let us now
consider the implications of an object devoid of character.
Kriz et al.’s study [14] inquires into how people’s attitudes
to robots connect to their expectations about robots. Notably,
the authors recognise the influential status of cultural depic-
tions of robots in relation to people’s expectations about
them: their study results suggest, overall, that expectations
about the ‘robot’s cognitive and social capabilities are highly
correlated with how a wide variety of robots are depicted
in fictional films’. However, certain capabilities, such as
aggression, though common in fictional robots, scored low
likelihood ratings in their survey, a finding that understand-
ably surprised the authors.
This finding becomes less surprising when one consid-
ers the appearance of the PeopleBot used in their study (see
Fig. 5). The robot looks a bit like a narrow treadmill frame,
with two ‘legs’ positioned underneath a console comprising
a tablet featuring the face of a white male, possibly in his late
twenties or thirties, sporting a serious expression (although
it is difficult to tell as the image is indistinct). Given that
PeopleBot lacks arms, legs, or anything that might function
as a weapon, it is unsurprising that respondents did not auto-
matically conceive of the machine in aggressive terms. It
would be a stretch to imagine the robot doing any damage to
anything. In this sense, Kriz et al. are correct when they sur-
Fig. 5 The PeopleBot robot. © 2010 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission,
from IEEE Proceedings
mise that ‘suspension of disbelief is finite’. Audiences need
a sufficient and appropriate set of physical cues to inspire
imaginative responses, which animate and anthropomorphise
robots. PeopleBot, which is not at all humanlike, is hard to
imagine possessing any kind of psychology or character. It
is evidently a telepresence robot and, as such, its ‘body’ is a
neutral platform for someone to ‘bring to life’ virtually.
9 Some Reflections on the Uncanny
In their study on the importance of predictive mechanisms
in perceptions of artificial human forms, Urgen et al. sug-
gest that ‘incongruence between an object’s appearance and
motion’ can give rise to uncanny responses [14]. The authors
write that the ‘uncanny valley could be explained by violation
of one’s predictions about human norms when encountered
with realistic but artificial human forms’. This is to say, from
an object’s form, we infer how it will move (and, in the terms
of this paper, how it will speak, act, and interact), and if
Fig. 4 These images relate to
Hanson et al.’s test 2 [9]. ©
David Hanson
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these expectations are violated, we experience an uncanny
response.
Urgen et al. explain:
According to predictive coding, the uncanny valley is
related to violation of expectations in neural computing
when the brain encounters almost-but-not-quite-human
agents. A growing body of work has associated Mori’s
hypothetical curve to the processing of conflicting per-
ceptual or cognitive cues, in which the stimuli are
compatible with the elicited expectations or are in vio-
lation of them. [14]
While the case is compelling—that our engagements with
objects in the world are significantly cognitive, arising from
experience and familiarity, and that incongruence between
(character) expectations and behaviours may be bound up in
uncanny responses—incongruence alone seems an insuffi-
cient cause for uncanniness. Incongruent character features,
such as may arise between appearance, movements, and
actions, can, for example, have comic effects. To evoke
uncanniness, something more seems necessary, something
pertaining to the form and quality of the incongruence, which,
most likely, corresponds with a potential threat.
Certain objects seem to predispose audiences to uncanny
responses through the ways in which they indicate particular
types of narrative and audience engagement. Consider the
figures of clowns and dolls as well as poltergeists and zom-
bies, figures that explicitly indicate supernatural thrillers and
horror films.
If, as this paper has already argued, humanlike artificial
objects at the positive end of the shinwakan scale belong there
because of their character forms and qualities, then objects
appearing at the negative end must belong there because
of their subverted character forms and qualities. If objects
produce positive audience responses because they appear to
be conscious, psychologically coherent characters that are
friendly, familiar, and sociable (i.e. these objects appear to
understand and like or love us), then objects at the negative
end of the axis are likely to be psychologically incoherent,
mysterious, irrational, or ambivalent, as well as strangely
familiar;4 and their social status as ‘friend’ must be insecure
(i.e. they appear not to understand or love or like us and,
uncertain of their motivations, we sense that they may mean
to do us harm).
Bruce Mangan, writing about the uncanny experience as
fringe experience [14], observes that it seems ‘to involve a
rare and complex mix of familiarity, wrongness, and a feeling
4 If Mori’s terms—shinwakan and bukimi—are opposites, then famil-
iar should appear as unfamiliar in its position at the negative end of
the scale. However, given Freud’s articulation of the uncanny and my
analysis of uncanny objects, I find strangely familiar a more compelling
negative articulation of familiar than unfamiliar.
of threat’. Anxieties may also arise, in a related way, from
the discomfort of having to cognitively re-orientate ourselves
in relation to a world that, while being semiotically famil-
iar, appears phenomenally and simultaneously strange and
unaccountable. Things are not as they seem. Consider Mori’s
discussion of the realistic prosthetic hand. He suggests that
the experience of shaking such a hand, which, at first sight,
looks real, produces an eerie sensation because of its ‘limp
boneless grip together with its texture and coldness’ [14].
When we shake a realistic prosthetic hand, says Mori, ‘we
lose our sense of affinity, and the hand becomes uncanny’.
Mori’s example of the prosthetic hand is revealing and
resonates with an uncanny moment I experienced watching
Geminoid F’s performance in another one of Hirata’s plays,
Sayonara (2010) [14]. In this play, Geminoid F is cast in the
role of companion to a young woman who is dying. There
is a moment in the performance when the human actress
takes the hand of the android and holds it to her cheek,
implicitly expressing her desire to be physically comforted.
(This is the moment shown in Fig. 2.) This particular action
prompted a wave of distaste in me. Imaginatively identifying
with the human character in the scene at an affective, embod-
ied level, I intuited that the hand of the android would feel
hard and lifeless or, to use Mori’s terminology, ‘limp’ and
‘boneless’. Also, it was evident that the robot did not return
the young human woman’s grip of its hand. This momen-
tarily jolted me out of my anthropomorphic assumption that
the robot is (human) like me. While maintaining imagina-
tive engagement with this robot performer as a sophisticated
android, I became abruptly and affectively aware that how-
ever humanlike this android appears, it remains ontologically
and phenomenologically distinct: it is not flesh and blood,
it will not die, and it does not feel. Its absence of living
warmth seems suddenly distasteful, its hand evocative of that
of a corpse; its relationship with time comes into view as
something vastly different to human time, a difference that is
strange and uncomfortable; and its incapacity to empathise
with humans becomes abruptly and distastefully apparent.
Touch, whether real or imagined, may strongly stimulate
responses to humanoid robots, perhaps because it moves us
from reading the object semiotically to grasping it affectively.
Rather than studying the object from a distance, we engage
with it sensuously, and respond to it at a more involuntary
level. Certainly, my own experience of meeting Pepper at
the Science Museum for its ‘Robots’ exhibition5 indicates as
much. The robot invited me to give it a fist bump. I had to
perform the fist-bump with a degree of surprising robustness,
then, pulling away, the robot wiggled its fingers at me. With-
out thought or hesitation, I copied it. This moment brought
the interaction to life. For this moment, I stopped perceiving
5 I visited the exhibition on 8 May 2017.
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the robot as something to study and marvel at and switched
into an automatic mode of social engagement. The interac-
tion moved from a performance to something that felt real.
Knight may be correct in identifying ‘full body gestures’ as
being important for tapping ‘into our emotional experience
in a uniquely human way’ [14], but there is something about
touch that may be particularly marked.
10 Conclusion
Drawing upon stage plays, theories of theatre and narrative
studies, and robotics research, including Mori’s theory of
the uncanny valley, this paper has identified, explored, and
interrogated elements important to the effective performance
of likeable sociable humanoid robots. In particular, it has
engaged with Mori’s reference to total appearance and con-
sidered how it might be useful to robotics researchers. It has
articulated ways in which Mori’s notion of total appearance
connects to realism in creating likeable sociable robots. And
it has argued that theatre, including its elements of perfor-
mance, aesthetics, character, and genre, can be employed to
bring to light features of robotics research influential in the
creation of humanlike objects that are likeable as opposed to
uncanny.
This paper’s key propositions and conclusions are that the-
atre can contribute much to the study and design of sociable
robots, particularly in relation to understanding the impor-
tance of total appearance and character in the performance
of likeable robots. Theatre also offers a lively and socially
complex laboratory to explore compelling ‘what if?’ scenar-
ios between human and robot characters.
The sociable robot is inherently a performer and needs to
be engaged with as such. The humanoid robot is performa-
tive, i.e. it establishes its identity and role through the totality
of its performance to a human audience or interacting person.
Theatre-makers, particularly Hirata and his play, Three
Sisters: Android Version, show how character is a powerful
element that can compensate for flaws in the physical per-
formance of human likeness by robots. These performances,
in combination with Mori’s concept of shinwakan, indicate
that kinship is almost certainly vital if artificial objects such
as humanoid robots are to prompt positive (or negative) shin-
wakan in interacting humans.
This paper, drawing upon stage performances and robotics
studies, has argued the importance of creating or represent-
ing aesthetically coherent representations of character, where
all the parts of character coalesce to produce a socially
identifiable figure whose behaviours are predictable. While
uncanny responses to objects may arise because those objects
appear both too humanlike but not humanlike enough, or else
because of category uncertainty, this paper has attempted to
show that details of character, including character incoher-
ence, are also likely causes of degrees of likeability. Further,
this paper has suggested that for a robot to be likeable, it may
need to avoid pretending to be anything other than itself, a
robot, however humanlike in appearance it may be. Acknowl-
edgement of its distinct species form may be important.
This paper has argued that audiences observe stage fig-
ures and worlds with binocular vision. When they observe
agents—human or otherwise—engaged in behaviours, they
conjoin real and imagined elements to create a total impres-
sion of the performing object. Mori himself refers to such a
tendency when he describes how audiences respond to the
total appearance of bunraku puppets.
This paper suggests that binocular vision carries over into
real life. Just as we read the subtext of characters performed
by actors in a naturalistic play, so we read the clues available
to us from the performances of people or sociable robots in
the world and we infer and imagine the rest. Our engage-
ment with a real object, be this object human or robot, is
equally reliant upon a binocular and dialectical structure,
which depends upon the active, imaginative participation of
audiences. Real-life performance is different to staged per-
formance not because it operates in the realm of empirical
certainty as opposed to imaginative belief, but because it is
really happening in the ongoing, improvised present and its
stakes are real, not purely performative, as they generally are
on the stage.
HRI research can exploit this capacity of humans to
respond to performing objects both cognitively and affec-
tively by attending more carefully to the total impression their
artificial objects create through their physical appearance
(including all features indicative of specific identity types
and social/narrative roles), use of language, voice, gestures,
types and qualities of actions, spatial positioning, quality and
speed of speech and movement, as well as touch.
This paper, building on the work of Schwind et al. [14],
argues that realism may be a broader and more subtle cate-
gory than is suggested by degrees-of-realism of appearance.
In the first place, in Mori’s account of matters, the realism
of some elements of appearance and context can offset or
compensate for others that are less-than-realistic. In the sec-
ond place, the concept of realism is complicated by the fact
that it is sub-categorised and structured by genre. Observers
attend to the total appearance of humanlike figures and, from
these, they identify character type and role, i.e. what those
characters do and how they relate to society. From such
identification, the robot’s behaviours become, crucially, pre-
dictable.
Furthermore, as Mori recognizes, total appearance trumps
realism of humanlike appearance for the promotion of pos-
itive shinwakan, a position corroborated by this paper’s
analysis of Geminoid F’s performance in Three Sisters:
Android Version. Analysis of this play also indicates, by
means of juxtaposing Geminoid F with her human coun-
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terpart, that species affinity is less important than character
type and quality for the recognition of kinship. For positive
shinwakan to be experienced, the interacting human needs
to recognize in the object (or other human) a consciousness
and character that bears some affinity with the human and
appears to be friendly. A sociable and emotionally gener-
ous character seems much more likely to prompt feelings of
kinship than an unsociable and emotionally close character,
irrespective of species.
This paper argues that the uncanny is not an inherent qual-
ity of an artificial object. The uncanny is a quality of sensation
arising from the interaction of a human with another human
or object, with which it shares kinship of some kind but which
appears to be ontologically other, or be operating at an inhu-
man level, such that it cannot be known or understood by
the human. In the gap, the human imagination opens up to
notions of the unknowable or, possibly, the supernatural.
As we come increasingly to share the human world with
robots, and as sections of human society come to be cared for
by them, the forms these robots take will be important to their
effectiveness as social entities. If we are to enjoy friendly,
trusting, and enjoyable relations with robots, they will need
to be characterized in thoughtful ways, which correspond not
only with the roles they are intended to play (as carers, shop
assistants, instructors, medical assistants, and so on) but also
with the identities of their intended interacting humans.
As Mori’s own paper indicates, research in the field of HRI
might really effectively draw upon theatre’s artful placement
and performance of humans, puppets, and objects in order to
make relatively simple robots appear as likeable kin, capa-
ble of engendering real feelings of warmth and friendship
in their interactions with humans. Just as fictional events on
stage generate real absorption and real feelings of sadness
or fear or happiness in audiences, so robots can be contex-
tualized and constructed to appear, in the totality of their
performances, as coherent and conscious characters, be their
characters humanlike, animal-like, or something else. Prop-
erly cast, characterized, and scripted, robots—even relatively
simple ones—can generate shinwakan in the humans with
which they interact in social roles.
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